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Abstract: A wide range of research points towards a perfect storm of crises in the global political economy, 
unprecedented both in scale and urgency, that signals the unravelling of the current neoliberal world order.  In its 
place we see a broad scope of political ideology returning to the fore of mainstream politics, most particularly the 
extreme-right and Fascism, across developed and developing countries alike.  This paper argues that to avoid 
existential catastrophe, pathologies must be suitably identified, understood and addressed in a post-Recession global 
settlement.  To do so, the article identifies and outlines the points of interconnectivity between three major existential 
crises in global finance, the global socioecological systems, and international labour/migration.  Following this, the 
article examines the effectiveness of two holistic approaches to addressing these crises: the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals and the Green New Deal, before examining the possible nature of a new global 
settlement that might scale-up efforts to realizing a sustainable political economy before it is too late to respond.
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Introduction: The coming storm
Almost four years ago Donald J. Trump won the election to become President of the United States （US）, having 
become the leader of the mainstream Republican Party on the promise of ‘draining the swamp’ i.e. removing corrupt 
and inept officials from power1）.  In the same year, a similar right-wing populist movement in the United Kingdom 
（UK）, which focused its political ire on the threat to democracy posed by bureaucrats, managerialist bodies and 
technocrats in the higher corridors of power within the European Union （EU）2） as well as immigrants, surged 
throughout the nation leading to a referendum in which just over half of the voting UK public elected to leave the 
EU.  The psychological response to slipping living standards has been withdrawal and disdain in the UK, as in 
countries across the world, and has become manifest in the dwindling support and trust for major institutions in the 
political economy and people in positions of power as well as to reject the multiculturalism taken to be another 
corollary of globalization.  Similarly, right-wing populism has thrived in Europe, as EU member states, which have 
no capacity for seigniorage under the European Monetary Union （EMU） and hence in response to the austerity 
measures imposed by the troika, i.e., the European Central Bank, European Commission, and the International 
Monetary Fund （IMF）, have had little other choice but to transfer the bulk of devaluation onto living standards 
through wage cuts, retractions of social entitlements, slashing investment into public services and utilities, and the 
deleveraging of historically and culturally treasured public assets （Lavery 2018）.
 Within these four years also, US dominance in the Middle East appears to be waning which has major implications 
for the global political economy.  The US is unable to exercise the same hegemonic power over the Middle East as it 
has since the Oil Shocks of the 1970s, which markedly altered the balance of power in the region by allowing other 
soi disant ‘big powers’, such as Russia, to exert influence over it （Thompson 2018）.  At the same time, the political 
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economy is suffering from a chronic deficiency in demand.  Growth in many developing countries has been reliant 
predominantly on asset bubbles and an unstable shadow banking sector which central banks are keen to provide 
backstop guarantees for in order to avoid at all costs downward liquidity spirals （Baker and Murphy 2018）. 
Therefore, central banks are propping up failing banks and financial markets and maintaining low interest rates, 
resulting in many advanced nations’ economies stagnating under continuing deflation and disinflation and increasing 
underemployment and unemployment while asset bubbles across the world lead to deeper socioeconomic divides 
across social classes and generations （Green 2018）.  Deficiency in demand also means there is a poignant lack of 
investment into the world’s most urgent and important areas such as environmentally sustainable technologies, 
infrastructure projects, research and development, and people （Baker and Murphy 2018）.  Thus, even if free-market 
capitalism were theoretically conducive to overcoming the worsening socio-ecological crisis, which is by no means 
certain, there is little evidence to suggest it is capable of doing so, while the rising divide in wealth which has 
attenuated growing social dislocations and political cleavages appears chronic, morbid and, ultimately, fatal.
 Addressing the ongoing and intensifying socio-ecological crisis, a scathing report on the response to climate 
change, entitled ‘What Lies Beneath: The Understatement of Existential Climate Risk’, made the following points 
clear.
1.    If the voluntary emission reduction commitments from the Paris Agreement are successful, the planet will 
likely warm by 3. 4C by 2100, supposing there are no long-term carbon cycle feedbacks;
2.   Models that assume carbon feedback loops have the planet warming by over 4C; and
3.    Warming of 4C̶which could happen by 2050̶could be so fatal as to result in the reduction the world’s 
population by 80 to 90 per cent.
 （Spratt & Dunlop 2018）
Whether or not the world is able to respond to these challenges, the global political economy, owing particularly to 
its dependence on the demand for fossil fuels, simply will not survive in its current form.  Therefore, this paper 
makes two arguments.  The first is that change is inevitable.  This is carried out by examining in more detail the 
various crises that beset the planet case-by-case.  Three crises are addressed in the following order: Economic Crisis, 
Socio-Ecological Crisis, and the Humanitarian Crisis （due to limitations of space, the latter is limited only to labor 
conditions and immigration）.  The second argument this article makes is that if change is inevitable, then what is 
necessary is the construction of new conditions upon which a fairer and more sustainable international system might 
be established.  This is carried out by analyzing holistic solutions to these crises and examining the ways in which the 
construction of a new international post-Global Recession settlement might be expedited.
Zombie Economies and the wealth divide
Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis （GFC）, governments have expanded credit in strategic sectors into order to 
boost demand to circumvent the deleterious effects of a slowdown and/or issued Austerity programs in order to 
reduce government spending which has caused a dramatic decline in living standards.  For the former, this has 
rapidly increased private and public debt to GDP and has fueled speculative bubbles which presage another, larger 
crisis down the road.  For the latter, economic conditions stabilized with private debt at too high a level to stimulate 
demand, leading affected economies into a zombified state of stagnation, disinflation and deflation （Keen 2017; 
Varoufakis 2015）.  Despite governmental attempts to stimulate private sector activity through Zero-Interest Rate 
Policies （ZIRP）, negative interest rates, the recalibration of the taxation system, and the deregulation of financial 
markets, the burden of private debt is too high to salvage a sustainable model of economic growth, while escalating 
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public debt to GDP pushes politicians towards cutting back on public spending to the detriment of many people. 
Unprecedently high-degrees of credit expansion is the result of neoliberal policy which sought on the one hand, to 
reduce the burden of state finances by deleveraging social securities particularly after the Oil Shocks, Iranian 
Revolution and stagflation of the 1970s, which in many cases, had grown exponentially during the 1950s and 1960s 
under Keynesianism in the world’s wealthiest countries.
 Neoliberal policies that rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s typically sought to liberalize markets which 
instigated private debt bubbles.  The practical reason for this is that the attendant growth in aggregate demand 
bequeathed politicians with the prestige and reputation of an ‘economic mastermind’ due to the fact that growing 
demand can calm social conflicts as public spending does while allowing politicians to reduce the social entitlements 
of workers̶something which would amount to political suicide under the previous Keynesian system̶in efforts to 
overcome a crisis of accumulation （Keen 2017; Streeck 2016: 16）.  Further, the unsavory collapse of an asset bubble 
has generally been blamed on the political incumbent at the time, often many years later, save for the rare example of 
Japan whose de facto One Party System left little room for the ruling party to hide and thus ignited the country’s 
political process in the 1990s following the collapse of its Bubble Economy.  Eager to attract and maintain at all costs 
free-floating capital with short time horizons, countries began to implement what Colin Crouch has termed 
“Privatized Keynesianism” （2009） in which private debt would take the role of governments to stimulate the 
economy and manage demand.  Credit markets for poor and middle-income people and derivates and futures markets 
for the increasingly wealthy expanded rapidly and unsustainably.  At the same time, governments focused on anti-
inflationary policies aimed at keeping prices of goods and services that lose their value once consumed low, on the 
one hand.  On the other, they deliberately managed the expansion of asset bubbles for assets and non-consumables 
that maintain their value once purchased so as to maintain market confidence in debt （Crouch 2009: 390-1）.
 Deregulation and the expansion of credit allowed the financial sector to create and utilize various forms of private 
money, which in turn facilitated the expansion of credit and debt to historically unprecedented levels.  This money 
and their associated markets essentially turned illiquid during the GFC when credit dried up and hung firms and 
banks with sizeable debt liabilities and financial obligations out to dry.  In a desperate attempt to prevent this, 
governments sought to provide various forms of protection, support and guarantees to its creditors and depositors, 
thus propping up their economies but at the expense of maintaining high-levels of private debt which suffocated all 
organic forms of demand large enough to drive economies out of their own self-made debt-laden quagmire after the 
crash.  Although these ‘organic forms of demand’ would theoretically emanate from the banking and financial sectors 
that had all but collapsed, these institutions focused on retrieving liquidity at all costs, leading to deflationary forces 
taking hold as lowering asset prices undermined market confidence to make debt-fueled investments – otherwise 
known as a liquidity trap （Varoufakis 2015; Keynes 1932）.  In the US alone, 4 million people became unemployed 
and an estimated one in 200 homes were repossessed, while the banking and financial sector as a whole received 
over $10 trillion US dollars-worth of assistance from the government （Varoufakis 2015: 161-2）.
 The expansion of credit, fueling of asset bubbles and utilization of private money has facilitated the extreme 
division of wealth in an increasingly individualized, insecure and unprotected political economy3）.  Today, the world’s 
richest 8 individuals own approximately the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of people on the planet 
combined, and the richest 1 per cent of people own slightly more than the rest of the world （Oxfam 2017）. 
Meanwhile, one in seven people do not have access to clean drinking water and one out of three people do not have 
access to adequate sanitation （World Health Organization 2015; United Nations 2013; see Bai et al. 2015）.  This, of 
course, is by no means a glitch in an otherwise functioning political economic system.  Incomes of the poorest half of 
people in the US have not grown in over 3 decades, while the richest 1 per cent have seen their incomes grow by 
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approximately 300 per cent （Oxfam 2017）.  The inflation of the money supply, accumulation of public debt and 
enormous expansion of credit fueled the financialization of political systems across the planet.  Further, governments 
that resisted the spread of neoliberalism had it imposed upon them, through mechanisms such as conditions for 
financial assistance by multilateral bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank or for membership to regional 
politico-economic frameworks such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development （OECD） or 
the EU, or ‘shock doctrine’ tactics （Klein 2008; Crouch 2009: 390; Kahn 2009）.  The political result of this has been 
the emergence of a transnational capitalist class with the power to exert increasing influence over the political 
economy and which has sought to address the issue of overaccumulation through further economic liberalization 
measures in new geographic or social domains and by shielding economic agenda away from democratic decision-
making （Streeck 2016; Crouch 2004; Harvey 2005）.  In the serendipitous event that the global economy continues 
without another financial crisis, the world’s richest 1 per cent are likely to own two thirds of global wealth by 2030 
（Frisby, 12 April 2018）, while developed countries can expect the loss of many forms of middle-income employment 
and the rapid increase of precarious forms of work which to a large extent characterizes the socioeconomic conditions 
of developing countries （Mason 2016; Khan 2009）.  Even making the dubious supposition that this would be 
economically sustainable, such a scenario is simply not feasible politically, and this is borne out by the rise of 
protests, riots and demonstrations4）, as well as right-wing populism, as discussed below.
Ecological collapse and climate change
Added to an idling global political economy on the precipice of another financial downturn is the ongoing collapse of 
the ecological system which underpins it.  The present target, as propounded by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change （IPCC） is to maintain global average temperature rises to 1. 5C of preindustrial levels.  For this to 
take place, carbon emissions must be reduced by 45 per cent from 2010 levels （which have since increased by over 6 
per cent） by 2030 and come down to zero by 2050 （IPCC 2018: 12）, a task which a statistically based probabilistic 
forecast evaluates at having a 1 per cent chance of happening （Raftery et al. 2017）.  In the three years since this 
publication, the odds surely have worsened.  Even if the world attained the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, there 
is nonetheless the risk that thresholds are breached triggering the activation of tipping elements which raise “the 
temperature further to activate other tipping elements in a domino-like cascade that could take the Earth System to 
even higher temperatures,” even as human emissions are reduced （Steffen et al. 2018: 8254）.  A worse-case scenario 
would see the world warm to levels incompatible to maintaining human life within this century.  Further, the planet 
has demonstrated its capacity for sizeable and rapid shifts in climate.  For example, during the end of the Younger 
Dryas （12900 to 11700bp）, temperatures in central Greenland rose between 5-10C in approximately a decade （Alley 
2000）.  There is little evidence to suggest that organized human society could adapt to such an enormous change in 
temperature and it is far above the scientifically accepted range of average global temperature rises for organized 
human society to survive.  We do not know that tipping elements have not already been breached.
 That catastrophic climate change is tied to human production and consumption is obvious.  It is also evident that 
the ecological crisis is fundamentally linked with the wealth divide and poverty.  The capitalist economic system 
under which the conditions of social production are organized is predicated upon the need for economic expansion in 
order to create and accumulate wealth.  As a result, it must surely follow that so long as economic output is reliant on 
the physical properties of the Biosphere, there must be a limit to growth as productive forces outpace the capacity of 
the Earth to absorb the waste of consumption and restock the physical materials required for further production 
（Kovel 2002; Li 2014）.  One factor possibly countering this trend is the contributions of technological innovations 
and developments in rescaling the balance between consumption and reproduction by attaining greater consumption 
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efficiency or even modulating the material ecological context to which capitalism, as a social system, is dependent. 
It is widely hoped, for example, that technological innovations in battery storage will offset the considerable problem 
of high input variability of renewable energy such as solar and wind enough to supply energy even when input is low 
and to store energy so as not to blow out the grid when input is high.  Doing so would stabilize the supply of energy 
and reduce total bearing costs （including operational costs） enough for it to be regularized on a mass, global scale.
 Technological innovation provides a useful means of addressing society’s rate of consumption of the Planet’s 
physical properties versus the Planet’s capacity to absorb its waste and regenerate the material conditions for further 
consumption; or, in other words, the metabolic rift between societal consumption and planetary recovery （Foster 
2000; Fischer-Kowalski 1998）.  However, it is extremely unlikely that there exists a technological panacea to the 
current ecological crisis that would permit the political economy to operate as unsustainably as it has up to the 
present day.  There are several reasons for this.  First, ‘techno-fixes’ such as geoengineering have the capacity to 
regulate climatic conditions on a regional/international scale.  Accepting, for the sake of argument, that this was risk 
free in terms of the climate and its complex web of interdependent ecosystems, the management of climatic 
conditions on a transnational or even national and subnational scales nonetheless has significant economic and 
political ramifications.  Solar Radiation Management, for example, is likely to depend on technocratic forms of 
governance without democratic legitimacy where climatic consequences across regions or nations would likely 
exacerbate social cleavages （Szerszynski et al. 2013）.
 Second, though improvements in throughput and output efficiency are an important factor in transitioning to a 
social system which is ecologically sustainable, increases in efficiency can reduce operating costs and hence induce 
increases in use and consumption which outweigh, nullify or reduce any realized gains – a phenomenon known as 
Jevon’s Paradox （Victor 2010; Victor and Jackson 2015）.  This might also be applied to the whole energy system as 
a driving force for consumption in general.  For example, the potential of thorium as a safer, vastly more abundant, 
fuel efficient and less pollutive alternative to uranium for nuclear energy and as a more stable clean energy source 
than solar and wind, is widely debated （Rubbia 2016; Kakodkar 2019）.  It is estimated that thorium as an energy 
source5） has the potential to supply the world’s energy as supply stands today for several thousand years （Rubbia 
2016）.  Setting aside the clearly dangerous fact that there appears to be relatively simple chemical pathways which 
make it possible to produce weapon-grade plutonium from thorium （Ashley et al. 2012）, were the potentials of 
thorium realized through significant funding, it would not solve the ecological crisis per se.  One reason for this is 
that given the potential abundance and efficiency of the energy source, it is likely that operational costs for most 
commodities would decrease which would fuel other kinds of consumption that directly contribute to the loss of 
biodiversity and the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles around the planet.
 A third reason for this is that renewables energies, like many technological innovations, are designed to solve a 
given problem̶in this case, dependency on fossil fuels̶but can cause new or attenuate externalized problems if 
implemented on a large scale in unforeseen ways.  For example, although pesticides facilitated the modernization of 
farming to reduce prices in food by increasing output with pest control, many of them have radically altered 
ecosystems across the planet abetting the loss of biodiversity which is now taking place at a rate equivalent to the last 
global mass extinction event around 65 million years ago, as well as impacting negatively on human health （Carson 
1962 ［2018］; Aktar et al. 2009; Rockström et al. 2009）.  Additionally, the manufacture of fertilizers for food 
production and the cultivation of leguminous crops have provided a means for societies to better meet its food 
demands and increase productivity gains, but they have also greatly disrupted global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles 
which exacerbates climate change, reduces biodiversity and reshapes Earth subsystems （Rockström et al. 2009; 
Guignard et al. 2017）.  Similarly, there is a chance that solutions to the problem of fossil fuels when scaled up could 
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still have grave consequences for the environment.  For instance, photovoltaic power is one of the planet’s fastest 
growing industries, and its rollout has been met with understandable excitement from supporters of renewable 
energies.  However, to maintain comparatively low costs in energy production, the number of solar farms which 
contain thousands and often millions of solar panels is likely to increase rapidly.  Clearing space for solar farms is 
undoubtedly an environmental issue, as is developing a rigorous and low-cost recycling system for end-of-life panels 
due to their containment of heavy metal pollutants such as lead, tin and cadmium （Xu et al. 2018）.  At the same time, 
bird fatality rates due to collision with monopole wind turbines was estimated at being 234,000 birds a year in the US 
alone, including rare species of birds, while wind turbines have also increased bat mortality rate, soil erosion and 
impacted on local weather and regional climate （Dai et al. 2015）.
 A fourth reason is that while technological innovations might provide new opportunities for market expansion and 
growth through the process of creative destruction, the widespread implementation of innovations can also set the 
barriers of new markets and operational systems and direct or otherwise limit further innovations.  Supposing that the 
requisite technological advancements in battery storage and infrastructures are not achieved before the large-scale 
rollout of wind turbines and solar farms, it is likely that non-clean energy sources such as natural gas and shale will 
be used to supplement the shortfall in energy supply during peak hours due to the high input variability of solar and 
wind energy sources （Verdolini et al. 2016; Knudsen & Foss 2017）.  Further, channeling investment into developing 
these energy sources and the infrastructure that supports them could limit the R&D funding necessary to improve the 
technological capacity of other potentially green alternatives, such as thorium, so that it does not become a 
commercially viable alternative.
 Technological innovations are undoubtedly necessary to address the ecological crisis.  However, the crisis that 
besets us is not solely ecological but is also social.  As Martin Craig （2018: 19） argues, the capitalist political 
economy requires that certain ecological conditions be in place for it to function, including access to natural 
resources such as raw materials, labour, energy, and food and that the supply of these resources be abundant and 
cheap so that production costs are controlled and profits maximized.  Environmental degradation and depletion, then, 
would drive down system-wide profits and threaten to undermine the system as a whole.  Many of these resources 
are already imperiled by the metabolic rift that exists between society and the Earth and could be fatally and 
irreversibly destroyed by unidentified carbon feedback loops （Lenton et al. 2008; Rockström et al. 2009）.  A global 
economic system dependent on growth further exacerbates the problem.  For instance, the Global Security Review 
suggests that the global economy will double in size in approximately 22 years based on the modest annual growth 
rate of approximately 2. 6 per cent （Stowell 26 April 2018）.  The material demands on the Earth that this would 
bring could easily breach the boundaries of other planetary systems added to climate change, the nitrogen cycle and 
biodiversity loss, such as ocean acidification, phosphorous cycles, land use and global freshwater supply （Rockström 
et al. 2009）.  The socioecological crisis is a crisis of capitalism and the political institutions that support it.
 Despite the rise of green political activism aimed at demanding that politicians address the problem （e.g. 
Extinction Rebellion 2019）, major political institutions nonetheless demonstrate their prioritization of political and 
economic concerns over ecological ones.  There is no clearer example of this than the July 2018 report from US 
Department of Transportation, a key agency of the Trump administration, which made the startling assertion that the 
planet will warm by 3. 5C by 2100 and implied that nothing should be done about it （U.S. Department of 
Transportation, July 2018）.  Additionally, despite the grim projections, there is nonetheless the notion that the 
political economy can survive the ecological crisis relatively unscathed̶specifically central, wealthy states̶which 
greatly downplay the scope and rapidity of changes necessary to avert catastrophe.  One example of this is the 
Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy （DICE）, used by the IPCC （Keen, 4 July 2019） and 
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developed by William Nordhaus （Nordhaus & Sztorc 2013）, for which he won the 2018 Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences.  The model draws the incredible conclusion that humanity should continue to destroy the ecosystem to 
maintain economic growth up to the ‘optimal’ temperature of 4C by 2140 （Nobel Prize 2018）; ‘optimal’ in the sense 
that it balances economic and ecological concerns.  For context, the paleoclimatic record indicates that this increase 
in temperature would cause the extinction of 50 per cent or more （some estimates suggest 70 per cent） of all species 
of flora and fora globally and cause tragic shortages in food production worldwide （Shah, 19 January 2014; Foster, 1 
February 2013）.
 According to economist Steve Keen, the model is based on an oversimplification of the relationship between the 
macroeconomy and the climate, such as by using a smooth function with no discontinuity to explain the perilous, 
complex and highly uncertain effects of climate change （Keen, 4 July 2019; forthcoming; see also Lenton et al. 
2008）.  Further, this economic model runs directly counter to statements put forward by highly renowned climate 
scientists such as Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, Katherine Richardson Christensen, Timothy Lenton, Hans Joachim 
Schellnhuber, and others who state that:
“With these trends likely to continue for the next several decades at least, the contemporary way of guiding 
development founded on theories, tools, and beliefs of gradual or incremental change, with a focus on economy 
efficiency, will likely not be adequate to cope with this trajectory.  Thus, in addition to adaptation, increasing 
resilience will become a key strategy for navigating the future.”
 （Steffen et al. 2018: 8257; see also Keen, 4 July 2019）
Within these ‘several decades,’ the planet is likely to warm to 4C above pre-industrial levels if holistic 
countermeasures are not taken （Anderson 2012）.  Holistic countermeasures, if they are realized, will surely 
fundamentally impact on the configuration of the global political economy, reflecting the fact that the crisis itself its 
one that strikes at the heart of the relationship between the Planet’s regenerative capacities and the social system that 
underpins the global political economy.
 Failure to address the socioecological crisis will lead to downfall.  Either wages in the capitalist core will be forced 
below subsistence levels or the crisis will be exported to the periphery under highly securitized conditions as 
advanced nations capitalize on stock and resources from developing countries （Craig 2018: 22）.  Even when making 
the irresponsible presumption of an absence of carbon feedback loops, a rise in temperature by an additional 1 or 2C 
could easily bring about change that fundamentally and irrevocably transforms global and regional political-
economic systems, if it is not already doing so （see Mann and Wainwright 2018）.
The humanitarian crisis: The unwanted and the disposable
Khaled Hosseini’s Sea Prayer, a child’s book written in memory of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old boy who drowned in 
the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 while attempting to flee danger and reach safety in Europe with his mother, father and 
brother, and whose body washed up on a Turkish beach, contains the politically poignant line of a parent talking to 
his/her child just before making a similarly perilous sea voyage:
“because you, you are precious cargo ［…］”
 （Hosseini 2018: 39）
Billions of commodities are sent to, from and around Europe every day.  And yet, approximately 35,000 people, 
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babies and children included, have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea seeking only the opportunity to escape from 
the hardships and miseries that have befallen them by entering an unwelcoming EU （McIntyre et al., 20 June 2018）. 
Too many people face a similar fate as unwanted or disposable components of the current global political economic 
system.  According to sociologist Saskia Sassen, these are examples of ‘expulsions’ which have arisen due to the 
“sharp growth in the number of people, enterprises, and places expelled from the core social and economic orders of 
our time” （Sassen 2014: 1）.  Large swathes of the global workforce are treated as though they are disposable and 
unnecessary, while refugees and low-income economic migrants increasingly are considered to be unwanted and 
have become the subject of hatred and abuse.  This phenomenon cannot be viewed in isolation.  The number of 
migrants will increase as ecological collapse takes place across the globe, while economic hardships and insecurities 
both increase the number of economic migrants as well as fear and anger among an insecure global workforce who 
are more readily susceptible to the manipulative rhetoric of extreme-right populist leaders and a new media 
environment, as discussed below.
 Despite the fact that psychological studies indicate that children whose parent （s） are detained or deported tend to 
suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder （Rojas-Flores et al. 2017）, which can have the knock-on effect of leading 
to certain crimes and further abuses （Maté 2018）, the US has promoted a ‘zero-tolerance’ stance on immigration in 
which the number of people deported who had already lived in the US increased significantly to 95,360 people and 
the number of arrests have skyrocketed （U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 2018）.  At the same time, the 
US embarked on a policy of child-parent separation for illegal migrants entering the US in what appears to be a 
deliberate effort to traumatize families whether as deterrent or simply for cruelty.  More than 2,737 children were 
separated from their families while widespread reports detailed abuses of children and substandard conditions of 
detention centers （Todres & Villamizar Fink forthcoming）.  Further, it has been reported that many of these children 
do not know the whereabouts of their parents when they are detained, that they are prohibited from hugging each 
other, and their ‘caretakers’ are prohibited from hugging or even touching the detainees （Frej, 26 June 2018; Fetters, 
20 June 2018）.  When commenting on the now famous video of children in cages sobbing and calling for their 
parents, child psychology professor Darcia Narvaez stated that “their brains are being damaged” （Fetters 20 June 
2018）.  As of the present day, at least six children have died in US custody since this crisis began （Todres & 
Villamizar Fink forthcoming）.  Despite this, lawmakers were banned from speaking with migrant children held in 
detention centers after being taken from their families （Thomsen 20 June 2018）, while for those that survive, the 
psychological trauma inflicted at such a young age is likely to be lifelong.  Cruelty to refugees and migrants is a 
widely reported chronic issue at the heart of the global political economy; today, there are 25. 4 million refugees 
worldwide, 6. 3 million from Syria, and 2. 6 million from Afghanistan （Horvat 2019: 64）.  With the ravaging effects 
of climate change and biodiversity loss, it is almost certain that this number will greatly increase6）.  With this, the 
treatment of refugees and climate migrants, based on current methods of deterring refugees, is likely to become more 
inhumane and crueler as anti-immigration sentiment increases pressure on governments committed to taking a ‘hard-
line’ （abusive） stance on immigration.
 At the same time, the other side of the humanitarian crisis involves the marginalization and abuse of the global 
workforce.  A major issue in this respect is the problem of unfree labour, in developed and developing countries 
alike, which typically includes “debt bondage, manipulation of contracts and credit, violence and threats of violence 
against workers or their families, and the predatory overcharging of workers for services such as accommodation or 
recruitment fees” （LeBaron and Phillips 2019: 1）.  While it is typically depicted as the result of unscrupulous 
employers and other individuals, it is fundamentally linked to the demands of the global political economy and 
exacerbated by states and other powerful actors seeking to attain comparative advantage.  The rise of Corporate 
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Social Responsibility （CSR） and, most particularly, voluntary corporate self-regulation, has facilitated the emergence 
of new models of business, some of which perpetuate this crisis with relative impunity because governments have 
sought to devolve authority onto employers whilst cutting the staff and budgets of the institutions who are tasked 
with enforcing employment and labour law （LeBaron and Phillips 2019: 13; Crane et al. 2018）.
 Modern slavery has resulted from the pressures of reducing labour costs and maximizing profitability which has 
led to the use of new activities to generate value for employers faster.  This involves enforcing debt-labour contracts 
by coercion and threat, turning workers into consumers for ancillary services such as food, accommodation, transport, 
immigration and so on, and relying on subcontractors and other mechanisms to obscure illegalities in labour practices 
（Crane et al. 2018）.  This, of course, is not limited to developing countries.  A pertinent example of this is the US 
prison industry in which inmates are compelled to work without labour protections such as minimum wage due to 
being forced into debt from being charged user fees for long-distance calls, reading books, police transport, case 
filing, drug testing, electronic monitoring, food, medical fees and so on （Brennan Center for Justice, 9 September 
2019）.  It also applies to Immigration Detention Centers across the UK, which are run by private contractors who are 
provided with a fee per inmate per day.  These contractors typically task detainees with ‘housework’ jobs to offset 
labour costs while paying compliant detainees approximately one-sixth of the minimum wage （Bates & Mayblin 
2018）.  Though the latter may not comply with the International Labour Organization’s definition of forced labour 
which describes “work that ［is］ involuntary because of force, fraud or deception, and ［where］ a penalty or threat of 
a penalty ［is］ used to coerce a worker” （Crane et al. 2018: 3）, it is nonetheless difficult to discern exactly where the 
line between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ can be drawn when members of the workforce are forced into such 
precarious circumstances.  This, indeed, is the situation that best characterizes the conditions much of the global 
workforce are faced with.  Today, “more than 75 per cent of the global workforce is in temporary, short-term, 
informal, or unpaid work,” most of whom are forced to live in increasingly precarious circumstances （Lebaron 2018: 
44; see also Allen 19 May 2015）, while the ILO predicts that approximately 11 per cent of the world’s children 
undertake child labour, many of whom perform hazardous work （Lebaron 2018: 46; see also ILO 2015: 1）.
 While poor labour practices are by no means limited to migrant workforces, the issue of insecure labour and the 
abuse of migrants/refugees, whether from another country or region within a country （e.g. see Chan & Selden 2017）, 
are clearly related outcomes of the exploitative dynamics and capacities of the global political economy.  This is 
particularly so in an era of financialization in which capital overpowers labour.  The liberalization of capital flows, 
technological innovations that have accelerated this process beyond the time horizons necessary for effective 
policymaking, and corporate restructuring in response to these pressures and opportunities, have all abetted the 
problem of worker insecurity （Jessop 2003; Collins 2003: 10-11）.  The free flight of capital has also allowed 
developed countries to sustain large current account deficits which has driven the expansion and development of 
global financial markets.  As a result, income distribution has shifted in favour of capital, at the expense of the 
majority of the workforce, while the banking and shadow banking sectors have relied on financial innovations in vein 
to insulate themselves from the risks of expanding credit to low-to-middle income households （Stockhammer 2012）. 
The rising inequality that has resulted from financialization has also stripped away policy levers designed to bolster 
leverage and bargaining power of workers which has increased employer power in diverse markets as well as 
monopsonistic markets, and hence suppressed wages （Bivens & Shierholz 12 December 2018）.  At the same time, 
financialization has facilitated the growth of offshore finance, tax evasion and money laundering which has decreased 
the tax revenue of states and led to cuts in welfare and social security so that the workforce are in an even more 
precarious situation with respect to their employers （Stockhammer 2012: 49）.  Without social support, many people 
in developed countries as well as developing countries have been forced into the labour market despite their 
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incapacity to work7）.
 This has had ramifications on the political process of democratic countries also.  Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. 
Page （2014） conducted a quantitative analysis on 1,779 policy issues in the US, and found that the US is essentially 
oligarchic because average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little to no impact on US government policy 
while economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have sizeable independent impacts. 
Within the European Union, peripheral countries such as Greece have lost competitiveness with central countries 
such as Germany due to their inability to address internal imbalances under the EMU, and so these countries have 
predominantly relied on labour flexibilization to adjust price levels （Stockhammer 2012: 46-7）.  The alienation of 
the workforce and political inability to respond is a significant factor in the rise of extreme-right ideology in the US, 
EU and elsewhere as populist leaders have sought to manipulate the anger among the workforce at the lowering 
quality of life.  Fascist rhetoric typically foments hatred and antipathy towards minority groups such as immigrants, 
refugees, and religious and ethnic groups in a politics of expulsion in order to justify the use of authoritarian means 
to achieve political ends.  Furthermore, this trend is exacerbated by a new media climate where news sources are 
increasingly fragmented and diverse, but platform and channels of content delivery such as social networking sites 
employ algorithms to deliver content most suited to keeping users engaged, so as to collect their personal data, 
construct psychological profiles （or avatars） of users and sell its information to third parties8）.  Thus, news content is 
tailored to the emotional profile of the individual by evaluating the users’ interests and providing news content that is 
designed to provoke outrage （Macleod 2019; Cohen 22 November 2019）.  As a result, the so-called ‘Silicon Six’̶
the US billionaires Mark Zuckerberg （Facebook）, Sundar Pichai （Google）, Larry Page and Sergey Brin （Alphabet, 
Google’s parent company）, Susan Wojcicki （YouTube） and Jack Dorsey （Twitter） ̶have provided the largest 
platforms in history on which fake news and outrage and fear inducing content, whether true or not, thrives and is 
micro-targeted at susceptible users （Cohen 22 November 2019）.  Without intervention in the political economy, the 
trends appear to point to a worsening of labour conditions, exploitation, poverty and abuse while the socio-ecological 
crisis will continue to cause a significant increase in the number of migrants and refugees seeking the modest aim of 
safety and employment to support their families.  Even without another GFC, which is by no means certain, given 
that increases in precarity and immigration are likely to be optimal conditions for extreme-right political movements 
to thrive, it is difficult to see how this is sustainable even for countries in the capitalist core.
The return of history: Can we save the future?
This paper has argued that following the GFC, the global economy is stagnating with low margins of growth, in a 
zombified and highly precarious state where another, perhaps larger, financial crisis could take place at any time. 
Added to this, it has argued that the mass extinctions taking place on the Planet and climate change are caused by 
human activity which is predominantly predicated upon the capitalist social system.  Further, both of these issues 
have abetted a humanitarian crisis in which large quantities of the world’s people are forced to live in extremely 
precarious and harmful conditions, while facing abuse and torment from social groups seeking to expel them from a 
given community of privilege.  All three crises are codependent in the sense that a deterioration in any one crisis 
marks the likely deterioration in the other two.  Decline in human welfare would further abet the issue of economic 
inequality, which is linked to climate change and biodiversity loss, and a key factor in the lack of both aggregate 
demand and financial stability at the heart of the global economy （Holmberg 2017; Mikkelson et al 2016）.  Another 
GFC would destroy livelihoods and thus abet the socioecological crisis, while catastrophic biodiversity loss would 
pull the rug from out of the capitalist social system, and cause widespread famine, epidemics, floods and so on. 
Therefore, solutions to the problems facing the global political economy must be holistic.  This is because these 
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intricately connected crises̶the economic crisis, socio-ecological crisis, and humanitarian crisis̶have not arisen as 
a byproduct of natural phenomena but are instead historical （Horvat 2019）.  There is no Deus Ex Machina; 
addressing these crises will require enormous political will and endeavor.  Until now, there have been efforts to 
address these crises.  This section discusses the potential and limitations of perhaps the two most prominent 
initiatives̶the United Nations （UN） Sustainable Development Goals （SDGs） and the Green New Deal （GND）.  In 
this subsequent section, the discussion turns to an outline of the necessity of a new international settlement in which 
historically-precedented changes to the global political economy might expedite the transition to a fairer, sustainable 
and more equitable international order.
 The SDGs comprise an extremely broad set of social, ecological and economic agenda which are summarized by 
17 interconnected goals that are to be achieved by member states before 2030.   The UN identifies a lack of regulative 
oversight as having caused disharmony between the directions of investment, technological development and 
institutional organizations which has led to unsustainable development patterns in the global political economy 
（United Nations 1987）.  Based on this, the UN has attempted to create and implement a set of policy targets within a 
global governing framework for member-states to meet within a given timeframe.  Though the SDGs were 
promulgated in 2015, they replaced the Millennium Development Goals （MDGs） which preceded them from 2000-
2015, while sustainable development has been a major theme within the UN since the early 1990s.  While the 
sustainable development agenda, including the MDGs, were successful in taking important steps towards improving 
people’s lives, there are a number of significant setbacks regarding international metrics and their political 
instrumentalization.  An example of this is the poverty reduction goal of the MDGs.  In 2015, the world achieved the 
laudable MDG of more than halving the number of people below the poverty line.  However, global poverty is 
calculated according to the International Poverty Line （IPL）, which estimates the income necessary to be able to 
afford the most basic necessities and which was set by the World Bank at $1. 90 US dollars per day （Karma 26 July 
2019）.
 Crucially, this is adjusted for purchasing power of each country, meaning that the poverty line is an approximate 
income equivalent to 1. 90 US dollars a day for those living in the US （Karma 26 July 2019; Woodward 1 July 
2010）.  According to David Woodward （1 July 2010）, calculating the IPL based on purchasing power parity （PPP） 
in a time of enormous divisions in wealth within nations has meant that it was set at an artificially low level because 
of the different patterns of spending between poor households and wealthy households.  Further, failing to account 
suitably for price inflation has meant that gains in reducing poverty, even within the reductionist framework of the 
‘poverty line,’ were overstated （Woodward 1 July 2010）.  In addition, the United Nations Children’s Front 
（UNICEF） assert that the setting of broad goals encouraged nations to measure their progress by national averages 
and so, attempting to make progress within the short timeframe of fifteen years, nations tended to focus pragmatically 
on children and communities who were the easiest to reach which attenuated social and economic divides and may 
have even slowed progress （UNICEF 2015: iii; see also Childs 1 July 2015）.
 Following on from the MDGs, the SDGs have had similar issues.  On the one hand, a comprehensive analysis of 
the 169 draft targets included in the SDGs carried out by a panel of forty scientists assembled and coordinated by the 
International Council for Science （ICSU） and the International Social Science Council （ISSC）, concluded that 
without clarification and quantification of targets, countries will struggle to achieve them or even to demonstrate 
categorically and empirically that significant progress has been made （Stokstad 2015; ICSU & ISSC 2015）.  On the 
other hand, poorly designed metrics run the risk of over-simplifying complex social issues like poverty and hence 
limit possible improvements in people’s living conditions.  Efforts have been made to resolve these issues.  These 
include attempts to better integrate the production of knowledge with policymakers and stakeholders within a given 
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geographical locus, and assessing the interlinkages between SDGs as well as the ecological, economic and social 
systems they are to improve （Bai et al 2016; Barbier & Burgess 2017; ICSU 2017）.  However, despite the clear 
potential of the SDGs, it is too late for incremental change and it is rather unconvincing that the translation between 
scientifically produced knowledge to precise and binding policy is the main barrier to a timely and rapid transition to 
a sustainable social system9）.  Discussing climate change, Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright （2018） make the 
following cogent argument:
“If good climate data and models were all that were needed to address climate change, we would have seen a political 
response in the 1980s.  Our challenge is closer to a crisis of imagination and ideology; people do not change their 
conception of the world just because they are presented with new data.”
 （Mann & Wainwright 2018: 7）
Despite the fact that the IPCC plays the very role in linking the scientific community to policymakers, the 
overwhelming majority of evidence suggests that mitigation of climate change to non-disastrous levels is now 
impossible and it is no inaccuracy to say that we do not know if it is not already too late to ensure the survival of 
organized human civilization.  Therefore, scientifically informed analysis may support more effective decision-
making by, for example, improving methods of observation, follow-up and monitoring of progress （ISCU 2017: 7）, 
but science is unlikely to be able to solve the problem of policy inertia because it is not a scientific problem but an 
inherently political one, and thus must be addressed as such.
 Conversely, the GND is a movement that is both nakedly political on the one hand, but on the other, it is also 
supported and pioneered by a number of international organizations such as the United Nations Environment 
Program （UNEP）, the ILO, and non-governmental organizations such as the New Economic Foundation （NEF） and 
the Green European Foundation （GEF） （Aşici & Bünül 2012: 295; Barbier 2010）.  With political movements 
supporting a GND, initiatives meticulously negotiated within the meeting rooms of global governing bodies are 
potentially sharpened and buttressed with a political framework to address issues of sustainability as well as a 
potential means for turning a given political framework into law （Klein 2019: 31）.  This is epitomized by the 
launching of a formal resolution for a GND by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey 
which outlined the key pillars of a sustainable transition.  Alongside these bold policy proposals, such as net-zero 
carbon economy within ten years, the report demonstrates an understanding of the interrelatedness between the 
socioecological, economic, and humanitarian crises explained above.  For instance, pointing to a “4-decade trend of 
economic stagnation,” “erosion of the earning and bargaining power of workers in the United States,” and existential 
risks of climate change, the resolution argues for a holistic response to unsustainability in the US which would 
address economic, socioecological and humanitarian concerns as part of the same problem （Ocasio-Cortez 5 
February 2019）10）.
 The GND is named after the 1933-1936 New Deal economic program enacted by US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt which included an array of social democratic reforms and public investment programs aimed at recovering 
the collapsed US economy following the 1929 Great Depression.  Using this collective memory of the New Deal, the 
GND, constituted another means by which to address the interlinking crises that beset humanity, but without 
addressing the issue in terms of ‘trade-offs’, ‘balancing’, or taking the so-called ‘middle ground’ between economic 
concerns with environmental ones.  Rather, they are considered part of the same under-riding problem of 
unsustainable growth and economic injustices.  Further, as pointed out by Naomi Klein （2019: 31）, the GND was 
backed by political movements such as the Sunrise Movement, and three months after the GND resolution in 
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February 2019, the majority of leading candidates for the Democratic Party elections signaled their support for it. 
Further, the GND has become one of the central pillars for the UK Labour Party11）, as well as key policy proposals 
for progressive political movements within the EU and elsewhere （Marsili 27 January 2019; Labour 2019; Barbier 
2010）.
 Despite this, the GND suffers from the same perils and risks as any political movement.  That is, a GND means 
different things to different people.  Indeed, Leftist accounts of the New Deal suggest that without sizeable public 
pressure, the reforms would have never been enacted as politicians would have wilted under the pressure from 
business interest groups and economic elites against progressive reforms to the economy （Hedges 2018: 301）.  As 
stated above, empirical research on US politics suggests that the latter groups have the ears of the majority of 
policymakers in the present day also （Gilen & Page 2014）.  Even when viewing GND policy agenda over two 
proposals between two of the forerunners in the 2020 US Democratic Party presidential primaries alone, there is a 
clear divergence in what the reality of the GND would entail behind its rhetoric based on whose program is 
ultimately implemented.  For instance, Joe Biden’s proposed GND entails spending 1. 7 trillion US dollars over ten 
years and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, while Bernie Sanders’ GND consists of 16. 3 trillion US dollars over 
the same timeframe with the aim of achieving full decarbonization of the economy by 2050 （Al Jazeera 23 August 
2019; Kaufman 4 June 2019）.  In a similar sense, without the requisite political will from the public, GND initiatives 
may be diluted, marginalized or otherwise rendered ineffective through policymaking apparatuses by politicians 
more inclined to prioritize short-term gains in Gross Domestic Product （GDP） through financial markets.
 A diluted GND is likely to incorporate innovations within the prevailing politico-economic system, most 
particularly market-based solutions, without challenging the prevailing social and power relationship based upon 
which structures and institutional organizations function.  Based on innovations already in practice, it is highly 
unlikely that a diluted GND would be sufficient to realistically avoid highly disastrous socioecological collapse.  One 
reason for this is that the right markets can make climate change profitable to speculators.  For example, markets for 
weather risk management which produce “catastrophe bonds ［and］ securities that manage the risks of improbable 
but catastrophic natural events,” （Cooper 2010: 175 in Fletcher 2012: 107） as well as other financial instruments, 
provide businesses with the opportunity to profit from ecological chaos.  Even if there were enough time, consistent 
incremental change to phase-out pollutive subsidies and harmful financial markets seems unrealistic for governments 
ideologically focused on marginal growth within short time horizons and large donations from economic elites for 
political survival.  Moreover, the climate crisis is clearly exploitable also by so-called disaster capitalists who benefit 
from privatizations of public spaces and resources as disaster-stricken areas undergo reconstruction （Fletcher 2012; 
Klein 2008; 2014）.  For instance, following the spike in global food prices due to the GFC, various states, investment 
firms, banks and individual investors sought to purchase land in poorer nations cheaply on the assumption that 
shortages brought about by the climate crisis will make for lucrative business for those that own the resources （from 
the land） in demand （Funk 2010 in Fletcher 2012: 107; Funk 2014: 144）.  A second reason is that market 
innovations do not address the issue of economic disparity and human exploitation, per se, and so mechanisms 
designed to outprice resources that emit harmful pollutants can face resistance once implemented.  Taxes on fuel 
have proven to be highly unpopular among the workforce if economic disparities are not also addressed – as 
exemplified by the Gilet Jaunes protesters in France who in response to President Emmanuel Macron’s raising of the 
fuel tax chanted ‘Macron is worried about the end of the world, we’re worried about the end of the month’ （Bryant 28 
February 2019）.
 Further, even a heavily funded and expansive GND has its limitations and significant issues it must somehow 
resolve.  For instance, the GND is predicated on the Keynesian notion of creating jobs through public investment to 
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increase aggregate demand and hence fuel economic growth.  At the same time, this investment would develop 
sustainable, zero-carbon industries and services in order to transition towards a sustainable political economy13）.  In 
other words, it addresses the problem of ‘underconsumption’ （see Craig 2018）.  A GND in a Keynesian context has 
the capacity to greatly expand productive capacities and hence expedite the loss of biodiversity as people consume 
more.  Moreover, as a result, areas of land and a vast array of flora and fauna must become market externalities under 
this system, lose their status as ‘commodities’ to be used for the purposes of production and accumulation as 
capitalism dictates, and be viewed, nurtured and supported solely as ecosystems instead （Monbiot 2013）.  In other 
words, these ecosystems must remain external to markets despite the pressures of market expansion due to a lack of 
profitable outlets for accumulated capital̶otherwise referred to as the issue of over-accumulation̶to even begin to 
address the metabolic rift that the relation between capital and labour has attenuated （Harvey 2005; Craig 2018: 22-
3）.  Despite this, current solutions to this problem, as made clear in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, involve 
expanding carbon markets across the globe by commodifying carbon in every ecosystem so as to monitor carbon 
emissions and regulate exchanges （Mann & Wainwright 2018: 115-6）.  In an era of rapid biodiversity loss, it is 
probable that similar systems will emerge for other key ‘resources’.
 Lastly, a Keynesian system must be international for it to have any effect in stabilizing the capitalist order, 
something which John Maynard Keynes himself was acutely aware of.  Despite the inherent problems of 
Keynesianism （and, for that matter, capitalism） in overcoming the socioecological crisis, however, the prospect of an 
emancipatory political movement towards a progressive post-capitalist system in time to avert ecological collapse 
appears forlorn.  The future is very much unknown.  Rather than speculate over what form these alternatives might 
take14）, the following section outlines a number of policies conducive to establishing a stable and fairer international 
economic order that a GND should incorporate, and from which, based on sustained political pressure from the 
public, further progressive political transformations might take place.
Constructing a new international economic order
A UN report which followed the 2009 UN conference on the GFC and economic recovery made an extraordinary 
statement at the time:
“［I］t is clear that current institutions and arrangements governing globalization and many national government 
policies have been based on a certain set of ideas and ideologies, while other ideas which might have been more 
helpful in avoiding the crisis and mitigating its size were overlooked.  The ideas and ideologies underlying key 
aspects of what has variously been called neo-liberalism, market fundamentalism, or the Washington consensus 
doctrines have been found wanting.”
 （United Nations 2009: 39）
In short, the global political economy is unsustainable and the reason this has continued has not been due to a lack of 
understanding per se, but due to ideology.  Despite this, the reaction to the GFC both at the national and the global 
governing level have been limited at best, reflecting a justified lack of faith in the capacity of politics to address deep 
rooted problems at the heart of the political economy.  As a result, the criticisms that exist of proponents of 
postcapitalist alternatives to the current social system of being unrealistic might easily be batted back to those who 
advocate for a GND or global-governing frameworks.  For one, a GND is likely to take place through national 
polities, despite the fact that all three crises discussed in this article are transnational problems borne out from 
instabilities in the current international political economy.  Second, a global GND suffers from a limited toolkit in 
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terms of obligating nations to comply with new agenda.  Third, surges in production and consumption will place 
additional challenges on the regenerative capacities of the Biosphere because of the demands of the capitalist system.
 Progressive alternatives to a GND typically involve new forms of collective democratic control of the economy, 
either to slow down productive forces in order to prioritize what is necessary as opposed to profitable, or to otherwise 
direct productive capacities to industries and services that are either decoupled or less demanding of the Biosphere 
（Aşici & Bünül 2011）.  However, the prefigurative potential of a GND, as seen in the context of the US and 
elsewhere, is precisely this point.  Realizing a GND requires the political activization of people to challenge and 
overcome the latent ideologies that define the status quo （Goatly 2007）.  Further, although Keynesianism itself does 
necessitate technocratic forms of governance to manage aggregate demand in a modern capitalist society （Mann & 
Wainwright 2018: 121）, the ‘quasi’-Keynesian welfare states of the Cold War generally struggled to achieve this. 
Keynesianism, like Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), ostensibly relies on maintaining a balanced economy, whether 
in terms of demand or spending between sectors and within a national economy.  The problem, however, is that many 
governments considered it political suicide to limit or withdraw public services even in times of growth because 
whether or not private investment could replace key provisions and services, it would lack public legitimacy, and so 
relied instead on inflationary tactics to temper friction between capital and labour.  Further, despite the technical 
management of the economy, the act of improving collective bargaining, wages and job security was considered 
among economic elites as giving the workforce too much leverage and thus, in a sense, over-politicizing them, as 
wages cut into profits （Streeck 2017）.  In this sense, the rise of neoliberalism from the late 1970s may be seen as a 
response to this very problem.  Capitalists were able to implement a regime based on market discipline and a small, 
non-interventionist state, which focusses on price stability rather than employment.  In keeping prices low, welfare 
and social securities would effectively be confiscated while the formerly socially protected workforce would 
increasingly have to rely on markets for basic services as other forms of collective protections at the workplace are 
dismantled.  Despite the flaws of Keynesianism, the era of neoliberalism has shrunk the state and weakened labour. 
The political consequences of this transformation are outlined by Mark Blyth （2016） as follows:
“The increase in government debt has allowed transnational capitalists to override the preferences of domestic 
citizens everywhere: bond-market investors can now exercise an effective veto on policies they don’t like by 
demanding higher interest rates when they replace old debt with new debt.  In most extreme cases, investors can use 
courts to override the ability of states to default on their debts, as happened recently in Argentina, or they can shut 
down an entire country’s payment system if that country votes against the interests of creditors, as happened in 
Greece in 2015. ”
 （Blyth 2016: 175）
Neoliberalism has had the effect of depoliticizing the workforce at large by insulating capitalists from democracy.  It 
has created a new system in which institutions and organizations deemed ‘too big to fail’ are backed by public wealth 
from having to face the consequences of reckless and unsustainable profiteering.  With this, whatever hypocrisy 
exists between capitalism and democracy, the fact is that tackling the inherent problems of the global political 
economy today does not mean that there must be a fully formed implementable alternative to capitalism at the outset. 
A GND reliant on political activism is about rekindling democratic participation in a public that has been deliberately 
excluded from the political process, by allowing them to have an increasing stake in the outcomes and directions of 
their own lives by expanding public services and increasing worker bargaining power within the private sector. 
Increasing political activism and participation in the democratic process does not foreclose the possibility of 
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transformation to a post-capitalist alternative, but in fact increases it, as efforts to transform to a more equal and fair 
international economic order under a GND might easily serve as a prefiguration to more radical and effective change 
presuming that the effects of crises intensify.  It is more likely that efforts both from within-system （GND and green 
growth） and without-system （postcapitalist alternatives） are necessary to fuel efforts at overcoming the crisis of the 
political economy.
 Due to this, political movements into a GND or ‘Green Industrial Revolution,’ or any variant thereof, must focus 
on the construction of an international order that reins in the unsustainable power of capital.  Particularly, for a 
Keynesian approach to green growth, it is necessary to organize states within a given monetary system in order to 
avoid the deleterious effects of ‘spillover externalities’ that result from uncoordinated national policies （United 
Nations 2009）.  In order to do this, there would have to be an international settlement that formally ends the 
petrodollar system at the heart of the global political economy and to replace it with a new monetary alternative.  The 
petrodollar system refers essentially to what former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing called the “exorbitant 
privilege” of the US dollar, while Minister of Finance in the 1960s.  The US dollar was privileged in the sense that it 
was the only currency directly tied to Gold during the Fixed Exchange Rate System as part of a post-war international 
settlement.  Following US President Richard Nixon’s decision to formerly and permanently sever the US dollar’s 
fixed tie to Gold in 1973, the international monetary system operated under a Floating Exchange Rate system14） in 
which currency value is determined by foreign-exchange markets, and it still is today.
 Due to the fact that other countries̶most significantly oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia and other OPEC 
states̶price their exports in US dollars, demand for the US dollar is artificially high making it the de facto world 
currency.  Further, the US has been able to run government and trade deficits with little risk of currency depreciation. 
Moreover, this also meant that finance managers had to find new ways to cope with day-to-day fluctuations in the 
rate of exchange of major currencies like the US dollar, such as currency hedging and diversifying capital assets and 
liabilities （Strange ［1986］ 1997: 9-11）.  In this way the Floating Exchange Rate is the root cause of unrestricted 
finance within the global political economy.  As the financial sector grew, investors, banks, hedge funds and so on 
have sought ways to insulate themselves from the risks associated with major shifts in currency valuations on foreign 
exchange markets as well as the risk associated with debtors defaulting on their own liabilities, while they 
systemically expand credit to low-income households and individuals for profit.  The result was an explosion in 
various forms of private money which undergirded the era of financialization and the political ramifications that bore 
out as a result of ‘supply-side’ economics.  Further, with international currency reserve status of its own currency and 
high-interest rates to attract creditors, the US was able to rely on capital inflows from foreign investors through stock 
and government bond purchases, thus financing its deficits and abetting the process of financialization （Varoufakis 
2015）.
 If the deregulation of financial markets is to be addressed properly, it must take place on an international level 
because exchange rate volatility causes enormous uncertainty and the free-flight of capital causes investor demand 
for liquidity to increase and dissuades them from making the kinds of long-term investments associated with 
transformative developments in green technology （Mann and Wainwright 2018: 119）.  As a result, Keynesianism at 
the national level simply does not have the same influence in a Floating Exchange Rate System.  Aware of the 
necessity to regulate capitalism at the international level, Keynes proposed the establishment of an International 
Currency Union （ICU） during the Bretton Woods negotiations over an international settlement postwar.  Due to US 
geopolitical ambition, the ICU̶named the bancor̶was replaced for the exorbitant privilege of the dollar and 




“［T］he ICU would grant each member country an overdraft faculty, i.e. the right to borrow at zero interest from an 
international central bank.  Loans in excess of 50 per cent of a deficit country’s average trade volume （measured in 
bancors） would also be made, but at the cost of a fixed interest rate.”
 （Varoufakis 2015: 66）
Thus, deficit nations could stimulate demand to avoid deflationary spirals without devaluing their currency while 
nations with excess trade surpluses would be forced to appreciate its currency as a result of being charged interest 
which would be used to recycle surpluses to deficit nations （Varoufakis 2015: 66）.  Bringing stability to currency 
markets would reduce risk for financiers and hence allow international development to focus more on long-term 
projects that can drive transformations to a sustainable political economy.  International development would rely less 
on short-term capital flows and hence a driver of transborder developments could be public institutions on the 
international level which are involved in long-term projects for welfare-enhancement and are supplemented with 
better public oversight and mechanisms for transparency and accountability through international organizations such 
as the Bank for International Settlements （Toritani 2009）.
 It is also possible that the petrodollar system will unravel in the years to come given that the ‘exorbitant privilege’ 
is coming into question from various quarters.  For example, Venezuela recently began to price its oil in Chinese 
Yuan to end what President Maduro called “the tyranny of the dollar,” while Saudi Arabia̶one of the central pillars 
of the petrodollar system̶threatened to stop selling oil in US dollars and the EU openly suggested creating a new 
SWIFT payment system to preserve the Iran nuclear deal following US withdrawal, thus minimizing the impacts of 
US sanctions on Iran （Reuters 16 September 2017; Sputnik 22 August 2018; Zhdannikov et al. 5 April 2019）. 
Further, Nicolas Sarkozy while French President recommended that the Chinese Yuan be added to the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights basket, while China, the EU, and Russia have sought to reduce their dependence on the dollar, with 
the EU calling on companies to use euros in energy contracts, China launching yuan-denominated oil futures trading 
on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, and Russia accepting payments in yuan for its oil exports to China 
（Fouquet 22 September 2011; Toritani 2015; Guarascio 5 December 2018; Cho & Kumon 7 January 2019）. 
Moreover, Zhou Xiaochuan as governor of China’s central bank and Dominic Strauss-Kahn, as IMF managing-
director, referred to the benefits of an ICU and a supranational currency reserve system to address the issue of 
financial instability, while the UN has openly discussed ways of “evolving” towards a global reserve system to escape 
the “fiduciary dollar standard” that exists today （Varoufakis 6 May 2016; Sina 24 March 2009; UN 2009: 92-103）.
 It is precisely because of the interlinkage of economic, humanitarian and socioecological crises that makes the 
unlikely scenario of a post-Recession international settlement possible.  Political activation under a paradigm-
breaking GND as well as the sustained effort to direct development models towards sustainability by the UN has the 
potential to lead to fundamentally transformative change.  Given the extent of the challenges that beset the planet, 
there is always room for skepticism in any optimistic view （Horvat 2019）.  Nonetheless, truly transformative change 
can only take place with international coordination and if the GND proves to be the political driving force of change, 
then it must focus on forming and utilizing the means of integration and coordination at the international level.  This 
undoubtedly necessitates the reformation of the international monetary system to one that enervates the monolithic 
power of the financial sector and reduces risk for meaningful investments to be made.
Conclusion
This article has focused on three interlinking crises of the global political economy, namely: the unstable and stagnant 
global economy, the socioecological crisis, and the crisis in the treatment of people as epitomized through labour 
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standards and the abuse of refugees/migrants.  Further, the article suggested that while all three crises have profound 
ramifications for the global political economy, they are codependent in the sense that the worsening of circumstances 
in any one crisis precipitates the exacerbation of the other two crises.  Moreover, it noted how holistic solutions to 
these crises have attempted to address the issue of insufficient aggregate demand and poor labour and environmental 
standards as codependent factors in achieving sustainability, stability and equity within our current social system. 
Despite the prevailing attitude of needing to balance economic concerns with environmental ones, new theories and 
initiatives have sought instead not to view these issues as though they were two objects placed on either side of a 
scale, but as mutually inclusive.  Though the reality is that economic prescriptions vary and do not always fit neatly 
within a given economic theory, Keynesianism and, more recently, MMT, have emerged as theories that challenge 
the neoliberal orthodoxy and thus entail a different view of the relationship between economic and environmental 
stability.  Although both theories imply a technocratic oversight of the economy, and hence a degree of 
depoliticization of economic policy, solutions that have propounded economic heterodoxies （in the current neoliberal 
world order） are ultimately connected to a surging political activism.  This political activism, it is argued here, is 
necessary if the world is able to make the right changes to the political economy in time given the political inability 
and, often, unwillingness, to mount an appropriate response, whatever one’s view about the feasibility of ‘green 
Capitalism’ over ‘green alternatives’.
 Due to this, the article suggested the ways in which transitioning to a green social system might be facilitated 
under the logic of a Green New Deal and, to a lesser extent, the UN sustainable development agenda.  It 
recommended the reining in of finance, as had been attempted under the New Deal itself with the Glass-Steagall 
legislation, but on an international level.  Most particularly, it agrees with the criticism that a Green New Deal 
supported by a Keynesian system would need meticulous, accountable and transparent international coordination to 
facilitate, which, frankly put, appears as farfetched as a timely, rapid and sustainable transition to a postcapitalist 
system.  However, because a GND and a UN sustainability campaign need not foreclose any such transition in the 
future given that committed political activism is the engine driving both transitions, the article sought to advocate for 
countermeasures to the largest problem that besets both views on liberal/progressive responses to the current crisis: 
an unstable and tempestuous financial sector and the international monetary regime that underpins it.  In doing so, 
the article examined the merits of a de jure ICU to guide trade and stabilize the global political economy.  Further, it 
argues that, while this seems inherently unrealistic, the fact of the matter is that the world appears to be moving 
towards a new international monetary system with soi disant competitors and allies of the US alike, discussing the 
feasibility of new monetary/trade agenda that undermine the current petrodollar system, and the UN as well as other 
economic elites opining over ways to ‘evolve’ towards a more stable monetary system.
 In sum, the paper argues that responding to the crisis that besets the global political economy, and more poignantly, 
humankind, means not only speaking truth to power, but standing up to it.  In this sense, a fair, humane and stable 
political economy can only be built by reining in the financial and shadow banking sectors on whom the political 
process within most developed countries and thus, by extension, the rest of the world has come to depend.  While the 
UN SDGs do ostensibly seek to facilitate changes conducive to the scaling down of speculative finance, it is the 
GND as seen in the US and, more recently, other developed countries, that openly challenges the financial sector by 
laying bare the ways in which it has caused the destruction of the earth’s ecosystems, destabilized the world economy, 
and rigged political systems to increase worker insecurity.  Any realistic response to these crises means addressing 
this issue not only at a national level but an international level as well.  Therefore, any GND must seriously discuss 
the ways in which it can launch and implement a new international currency regime at a time in which governments 
and economic elites around the world are becoming increasingly aware of the weakening petrodollar system at the 
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heart of the present currency regime.  However, because of the fact that there is little̶if any̶time left to address 
these crises in time to ensure the survival of organized human society, international coordination must be a central 
pillar of any GND, or postcapitalist system for that matter, that realistically aims to address the global crises that 
beset us.  A new currency system must be at the center of progressive demands for a sustainable future.
1） This was formally enacted during the 1978 Jamaica Accords.
Endnotes
1） At present, it is still uncertain as to whether President Trump himself will be impeached on the charge of corruption.
2） This innate distrust of non-Parliamentary commissions and bodies is not only related to regional and global governing 
institutions.  UK elections over the last three decades have often focused obsessively on the disorganized nature of delegation 
in the UK and the haphazard and abstruse use of semi-autonomous administrative bodies known as quangos （Flinders 2008）.
3） Except, of course, for the major banking and financial institutions, who are ‘too big to fail’.
4） The sensitivity of the current political economic system may be understood through the riots in Chile, for example.  The 
tipping point for such a large-scale response from the Chilean public was allegedly the government’s decision to raise the 
metro rush hour prices by only 30 pesos （approximately $0. 04 US dollars or ¥4 Japanese yen） and the Minister of Economy, 
Andres Fontaine, comment that those who did not support it should wake up earlier to pay less （McGowan, 31 October 
2019）.
5） Thorium itself is not a fuel but instead is converted into a type of a fissile artificial uranium isotope when bombarded with 
neutrons, which is used as fuel （Ashley et al. 2012）.
6） The World Bank estimates that the number of “climate migrants” may increase to 143 million people by 2050.   Other 
estimations suggest that this is too conservative （World Bank 2018）.  For example, the Environmental Justice Foundation 
claims that 10 per cent of the global population is at risk of forced displacement （Vidal 3 November 2009）.
7） The Department for Work and Pensions in the UK, for example, estimated that between December 2011 and February 
2014 （32 months） 2,380 people died “after their claim for employment and support allowance （ESA） ended because a work 
capability assessment （WCA） found they were fit for work” （Butler, 27 August 2015）.  Though this would not be classed as 
forced labour under the ILO definition, as above, it is difficult to see how it is voluntary.
8） This information, of course, is not used solely for marketing.  The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal revealed 
that the harvesting of psychological data based on research of tens of millions of Facebook users was used for political 
purposes in an entirely dishonest and highly manipulative manner （Davies 11 December 2015）.
9） However, this is not in any way to suggest that research aiming to facilitate policy implementation from scientific 
knowledge production is not worthwhile.  Increasing global interconnectivity and technological progress has shortened time 
horizons for policymaking while also rendering a number of social and political issues increasingly technical and esoteric, to 
which policymaking has struggled at times to adapt.
10） GND literature often emphasizes the ‘triple crunch’ of a financial/economic system in crisis, anthropomorphic climate 
change, and a probable peak in global fossil fuel energy supplies in the coming decades （e.g. Green New Deal Group 2008）. 
This article has taken a different approach and subsumed peak oil into a crisis of economy for reasons which are elucidated 
in the article’s penultimate section, and instead discussed the humanitarian crisis with respect to labour and migration.
11） The GND is also referred to as the “Green Industrial Revolution” in Labour Party’s 2019 manifesto （Labour 2019）.
12） Following Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez reference to Modern Monetary Theory （MMT） when discussing the GND （Horsley 
17 July 2019）, MMT has become are focal topic of discussion regarding funding for a GND.  MMT, influenced from the 
works of John Maynard Keynes among other seminal economists, asserts that because governments have control over their 
own currency （excluding Eurozone states）, they are able to implement large and comprehensive spending programs provided 
that there is a constraint on inflation and markets do not lose confidence in governments （Wray 2015; Palley 2013; Harvey 5 
March 2019）.  With increasing debate surrounding MMT, five Republican politicians made the shocking move of submitting 
a resolution in the US Senate to formally condemn it – in other words, condemn an academic theory （Harvey 3 May 2019）.
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13） See Kovel （2002）, Mason （2015）, Li （2017）, Mann and Wainwright （2018）.
14） This was formally enacted during the 1978 Jamaica Accords.
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機間の相互連鎖的な関係を解明し、国連持続可能開発目標（UN Sustainable Development Goals）とグリー
ン・ニュー・ディール（Green New Deal）である、崩壊を防ぐための総合的な対策の 2つを取り上げて、
それぞれの計画の効果性を検討する。すると、持続可能な政治経済システムに対する迅速な転換の実現を
加速させるための国際政治経済体制の改革のあり方を講じる。
キーワード： グローバル金融危機、リーマン・ショック、気候変動、生物多様性損失、労働の不安定化、
難民危機、国連、持続可能開発目標、グリーン・ニュー・ディール、国際通貨金融システム、
貧富の格差

